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Literature

"Of Being Numerous" and the Romantic Poetics of George Oppen
Chairperson: Robert Baker
George Oppen's long serial Poem "Of Being Numerous" is a
late modernist exploration of traditionally Romantic themes
such as the individual's place in relation to the larger
social world and poetry's role in that world. Also of
central concern is the Romantic attempt to renovate a
fallen, commodified world.
Through the Philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Martin
Buber we find an uneasy individual stance that refuses both
the solipsistic isolation of the hermetic and the
unreflective everydayness of the "numerous" masses. Oppen
instead concentrates on a smaller, family-based, chain of
relationships that allows him a clearing in which to open
himself to poetic vision.
The poem moves through horror and despair at what it means
to be "numerous" and ends in a mode of quietude, a mode that
celebrates basic human connection and the miracle of Being
itself.
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"Of Being Numerous" and t:he Romant:ic Poe-tics of George Oppen
To Celebrate is my will; but what? And to sing with others,
but in this utter solitude I lack all that's divine.
-Holderlin

Introduction: The Poem Grows
In 1789 William Blake produced his first copy of Songs of
Innocence, a small though complex group of short lyrics
which examined innocence itself as a problem to be dealt
with, as a question. The poems are deceptively simple, the
moral and political placement of the speaker shifting from
one poem to the next and sometimes vanishing completely into
the background. They do their best to form a whole.
About five years later (Blake dates it 1794), Songs of
Experience appears. The two books are brought together and
described as "Shewing the Two Contrary States of the Human
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Soul." Careful readers acknowledge a wink and a nod with
this description. The irony is subtle but central. The work
already begun in Songs of Innocence is carried to a pitch
with the introduction of Songs of Experience. Namely, the
deconstruction of the very categories being attended to.
Particularly interesting in this changing context is the
inclusion of identical poems in each volume. "Little Girl
Lost" and "Little Girl Found," for example, enact a shift of
perspective within the poems themselves. The poems"
prophetic voice and imagery both express and dismiss the
supposed dangers (physical, sexual, etc.) of seven-year-old
Lyca's oblivious innocence. The first poem exposes the
untruth of these fears, and the second discloses this new
truth to her parents, those 'experienced' souls who fear the
worst. When these poems are transferred to Songs of
Experience, they undergo a greater transformation than that
of coloring. The expanded context and --only supposed—
reversal of perspective change the implications of the
vision, explode it, refuse to allow it to remain explicable
as 'innocent' dreaming. Placing the vision in a context of
experience politicizes and radicalizes the vision. The poem
is growing.
More than a hundred and fifty years later (1965),
George Oppen's volume This In Which appears, and within this
volume we find a poem entitled "A Language of New York." It
is a small grouping of eight short lyrics, hammering at its
theme, its problem, its question. The question is Humanity,
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and the prognosis, judging by the poem, is not good. Section
after section indicts modern humanity, especially as
typified by the modern city-dweller, for crimes of
stupidity, shallowness, cruelty, wanton consumerism, and the
almost complete emptying out of language. Section two
assures us in our revulsion:
...they will come to the end
First of all peoples
And one may honorably keep
His distance
If he can.

End stop. Period. But of course, that's not the end. The
poem attempts, futilely, to turn, to find what Oppen will
later refer to as "the boundaries of our distance" (CP 165),
with the reminders of actual, particular men he has known.
This singularization is a momentary balm that cannot stand
against the "force within walls" that is humanity. Every
small redemptive move the poem makes is short-circuited,
deconstructed, exposed. The poem is powerful in its pathos,
in its phlegm, and in its failure. This poem never fully
turns upon itself, never approaches its real questioning.
Three years later. Of Being Numerous is published, its
title poem comprised of forty short lyrics, turning and
turning upon themselves. Seven of the eight sections of "A
Language of New York" appear within it, only mildly
revised^- The seed, when set beside the forever circling

^Section four is abandoned for what I can only imagine to be its
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rings of the new poem, is transformed. The shock, as Oppen
might say, is metaphysical.
This similarity between Oppen and Blake is accidental
though instructive, but there are greater, deeper, and
essential similarities as well. Oppen inherits a visionary,
often apocalyptic, poetic from Blake and his contemporaries,
and continues to employ and destroy Romantic dialectical
movements. Like so many moderns, he is struggling with the
ever more complex consequences of Enlightenment and Romantic
modes of thinking and can no longer consider truly shedding
the new life these revolutions built up, but also lives
daily with the horror that has come of it. It has often been
said that the Romantic movement goes downward and inward^,
and the Romantic impulse may finally be grinding to its
logical conclusion, a conclusion most of the Romantics
foresaw and feared: solipsism on a massive scale. The modern
world sees the individual turning inward, separating from
its community, and appearing to find none of the revelatory
sources of creative power dreamed of by the Romantics.
Oppen, standing in the midst of the failure of Enlightenment
ideals, the Romantic project, and his own involvement in a
failed Marxist project,

continues this dialogue, re-shapes

it in troubling and fascinating ways, trying to reverse the

too-overt discussion of the building of the poem. Of Being Numerous
instead allows this discussion to arise as a kind of subtext,
^c.f. Northrop Frye "The Drunken Boat: the Revolutionary Element in
Romanticism" in The Stubborn Structure (London: Methuen, 1970), p 203,
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inward movement, to re-think our numerousness and somehow
still cling to our singular and Romantic ideals.
Or so this essay hopes to prove. In its full context,
"Of Being Numerous" forms an incredibly complex,
occasionally impenetrable poem of crisis. The crisis is not
new, and it is not unfamiliar to Blake and his fellow
Romantics. The crisis is that of the single human attempting
to realize an authentic relationship with his world and his
fellow human beings. "A Language of New York" outlines the
initial crisis, that of the fallen state of that world. The
forestalled apocalypse of "Of Being Numerous" compounds the
crisis by attending to the simultaneously solipsistic and
creatively productive aspects of the 'poetic' refusal of
that world. The crisis is, therefore. Romantic. That is to
say, at its best

it is human and undogmatic in its reaction

to modernity. That is to say, it attempts to ward off
despair. Its charms are its words, its talismans are its
faith in its language. The poem grows with its questioning.
This essay will attempt a patient reading of all forty
sections of "Of Being Numerous" while contextualizing the
sequence within the framework of a Romantic crisis as well
as the Heideggerian and Buberian philosophical tensions that
help to shape the poem's movements. This means I will
attempt to explicate a poem meant to be undergone,
essentially to transcribe the dialogue between one reader
and the poem and pretend that the poem has spoken, "which
act is/ violence" (CP 98). The hope, meager enough, is to
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focus a simple spot of light upon this extraordinary poem.
The faith is that this spot of light, artistic or not, will
not demean us.

Part: One: The Fallen World (sections 1-8)
There are things
We live among 'and to know them'
Is to know ourselves'.
The poem opens with an assertion that throws us back to The
Materials and its epigraph from Maritain (apparently the
only meaningful contribution by Maritain to Oppen's
thinking). It introduces Oppen's worldliness, his dedication
to the possibility of humanity's authentic relationship to
the world. And the next lines:
Occurrence, a part
Of an infinite series.
The sad marvels;
introduces a vexed and vexing temporality, a troubling
though inescapable conception of history that will become a
major factor in the poem (CP 147). This is not Pound's "poem
including history," far from it, but rather a meditation
upon how history does or doesn't contain the poem, a lament
for the schism that lies between the two. At least this is
one thread of the poem. One lament of many. So many tales of
wickedness, the occurrences in which the world is made real,
is disclosed, in which we "know ourselves." But this is not
our wickedness, we are told, and the voice comes like
Blake's. But which Blakean voice is it? Is this the
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prophetic voice of "Little Girl Lost" that assures or the
"voice of the devil," come not to comfort but to challenge?
And lest we are lured too easily into the former view,
lest we think we're heading toward some Emersonian
celebration of nature, Mary Oppen's words sound a respectful
though somewhat despairing note. Despairing or not, the
location is unquestionably edenic. That it is a fallen Eden
is demonstrated by the gap between man and his world. The
world and its things are viewed through the "ruined window"
—a career-spanning trope for the poem^— and all that seems
to come of this vision is a drastic uncertainty. The natural
world itself seems to actively cover itself over, to obscure
itself.
And so to speak the existence of things is a task being
taken up, a challenge to be met, already short-circuited by
the "world," the Spring, the machinations of time that
obscure any objective approach (CP 148). That this is an
"existence of things," that is that the world is made of
things, is borne out by Wittgenstein and Heidegger and acts
(quite independently of both thinkers) as a central tenet of
Oppen's faith. But this fairly simple tenet is challenged
both by those natural obfuscations and by the technological
manifestation of modernity as the force that makes the world
an object for its subject. Things become objects.'^ There is

^Cf. Maude Blessingbourne back in Discrete Series (CP 3).
^In Being and Time we learn that this interpretation of knowledge
"contains as much 'truth' as it does vacuity," and "subject and object
are not the same as Da-sein and world" (56). Even the formulation of a
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a tension here for the poet as metaphysician. While one
recognizes the dangers of a pure Cartesian split, of an
objectifying metaphysic, one is also dedicated to a poetry
(especially as found in imagism) of sight, of 'vision' as
understood in a very grounded and worldly context (I will
have more to say about Oppen as imagist later). Such a
poetry relies almost totally on the belief in a world that
exists "out there." This is simply one more instance of the
incompatibility of poetry with the 'real' (i.e. political)
world. Oppen does not miss this incongruence, but meditates
upon it. It is finally a central concern, for one way of
demonstrating the singular and numerous dichotomy comes by
trying to reconcile Oppen's dedication to dialogue and
community with his assertion that "the only life for
humanity is the life of the mind" (The Contemporary Writer
177). This is Cartesian talk, and it may be dangerous talk,
but it points us on our way to seeing how Oppen's "singular"
antihero is the poet, and he may just be the only hero left.
More of this later.
While Mary speaks in awe at the inexplicability of the
'natural world,' which is always simultaneously closing and
disclosing itself to us, there is in section two an
rejecting statement is said to be fatal, as it allows the grounding
metaphysic to remain unchallenged. It is important to note that while
much of the poem's vocabulary is Heideggerian, that vocabulary doesn't
quite bear out in Oppen's poetics (there is no such simplicity of
differentiation for Oppen between objects and things) but the 'force'
and the procedure are inescapable. Oppen refuses dogmatism of any kind,
but, instead, utilizes a dialectical movement --even when clearly
rejecting one side of the dialectic-- to tease out and "test" the truth
of his poem.
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ironically pejorative description of the world as
"unmanageable." The adjective speaks not only of
objectification but of a kind of utilitarian relationship to
'nature' that is vexing to Oppen. There is a tension here
between a thinker who recognizes the oppressive and
nihilistic metaphysics that objectifies and empties out
things and language and a man whose Marxist leanings are
always tempting him to push such considerations behind the
simple question of human happiness. More often than not,
Oppen's conscience keeps him on the former path, but the
latter is always there as a safety net when he falls into
despair over the seeming impossibility of his task.
-.V.

What is certain is that the natural world is covered
over by the "city of corporations" in which the
objectification is in direct service to a commodification of
these 'objects.' The syntactic doubleness of "Glassed/ In
dreams// And images--" speaks of a reciprocal movement in
which the human mind's poetic sensibility is both
commodified and constituted by vulgar consumerism -glassed
in- and the way in which that sensibility has been
sublimated and exploited in order to build this city of
corporations which is "glassed" in dream images: advertising
that seems to constitute the very structure of the city.
But already there is a turn signaled by the dash; the
"pure joy/ Of the mineral fact" is joy. Joy is not a word
found ironized in Oppen; it is in some sense the extremity
of human experience: the revelation. "The mineral fact"

y: .0
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returns us to the 'thingness' of the world. As in "The
Building of the Skyscraper": "we look

back/ Three hundred

years and see bare land" (CP 131). But it is not only that
somewhere beneath the city there is "world," but that the
city is a world, that a populace flows through it, is born,
lives, and dies. And there is always a desperately hopeful
belief in the purity of the world that finds comfort in the
steel and stone that make up the mineral fact of the city.
As Reznikoff's steel girder is "still itself" among the
rubbish, the world continues to assert itself as world even
in the corporate city {Complete Poems of Charles Reznikoff
1; 121), Whether anyone recognizes this assertion may of
course be the sole deciding question. The possibility of joy
comes from this awareness, this revelation: what constantly
asserts itself in Oppen's poetry as the miracle of place. As
Wittgenstein has it: "It is not how things are in the world
that is mystical, but that it exists" {Tractatus 149). It is
this "mystical" awareness of the miracle of the world and
the constant return, with Heidegger, to Leibnitz' question:
"why is there Being at all and not rather Nothing?" that
serve as groundings for both Oppen's faith and his poetics.
The poem's return to the impenetrability of the world
--notably sexual language applied to the Freudian city of
sublimated desire-- is a movement toward this faith, toward
faith as a kind of metaphysical negative capability, a
willingness to reside within the unmanageable and
inexplicable, to approach it with awe.
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This understanding of the city as 'world' is borne out
by the phenomenological reaction to it. "The emotions are
engaged/ Entering the city/ As entering any city" (CP 149).
The stagnant monuments of the tenements both await us (cf.
sect. 21) and outlast us (cf. "Party on Shipboard" CP 13).
In Heideggerian terms, we are "thrown" into this already
extant world. The thrust of this section skirts this idea
only briefly and moves into the central question and problem
of the poem (and Oppen's poetics as a whole): the question
of humanity.
In an important interview with L.S. Dembo, Oppen says,
"Of Being Numerous asks the question whether or not we can
deal with humanity as something which actually does exist"
(The Contemporary Writer 175). Section 3 approaches the
question negatively- We encounter others as part of the
city, coeval with it. They are part of the world into which
we are thrown. This already objectifies the other, even
identifies the other with the city itself. We see others as
things. But there is a further distancing that occurs by
recognizing the gap between the self and the "populace"
that flows through the city- This is meant as a revision of
what we "imagine," i.e. that others are simply objects in
the world, but is clarified into a more complex and
uncertain force. The singular noun "populace" for the many
which it is liberates the others from static thingness but
also performs a further violence. The objectification of
human beings is carried to its logical conclusion as a
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singular object: humanity. This object is destructured and
metamorphosed into a force. "This is a language, therefore,
of New York." That is to say, this is of necessity, this is
already understood.
"The people of that flow/ are new" picks up the river
metaphor and extends it into a symbol for an inauthentic
being-in-the-world that moves through the city, finding
everything new (CP 149). This emphasis on the "new" has been
critiqued quite thoroughly by Heidegger. It finds itself
manifest as "curiosity," or the "restlessness and excitement
from continual novelty and changing encounters" [Being and
Time 161). This "curiosity" is part of Da-sein's falleness
or falling prey, and the allusive calling up of the biblical
Fall that comes with that name works in much the same way as
the "tale of our wickedness"; it connects the knowledge of
the world with our separation from it. This semi-active way
of being appears to have little bearing on this "flow" until
we arrive at the curious newness in relation "to their
dwelling." The term is almost certainly adopted from
Heidegger, the singular "dwelling" for the plural "their"
signifying their way of being rather than simply their homes
or dwelling-places. The Heideggerian dwelling encompasses
both, showing how the way one lives in relation to the
earth, to one's world, is constitutive of one's being.
Da-sein, as being-in-the-world, is one who dwells. The flow,
the nameless force that moves through the city, does not
have this relationship to its "there." The "tarred roofs/
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And the stoops and doors--/ A world of stoops--/ are pettyalibi." They stand as a mockery of authentic dwelling, not
in their structure itself --that is to say not in a simple
dichotomy of urban and agrarian-- but in the way their
building is experienced.
Building as Dwelling, that is, as being on the earth,
however, remains for man's everyday experience that
which is from the outset "habitual" --we inhabit it, as
our language says so beautifully: it is the Gewohnte.
For this reason it recedes behind the manifold ways in
which dwelling is accomplished, the activities of
cultivation and construction. These activities later
claim the name bouen, building, and with it the fact of
building, exclusively for themselves. The real sense of
bouen, namely dwelling, falls into oblivion.
[Poetryr Language^ Thought
147-8)

The people of that flow "inhabit," but they do not dwell.
They approach dwelling as newness, as novelty. They are, to
use a central trope, rootless, and "satirical wit/ will not
serve." That is to say, it is no joke. This rootlessness has
powerful ramification.

In his The Pound Era, Hugh Kenner makes much of The
Cantos' "signed Column." It is a simple double column cut
from one stone, and signed by the craftsman in a gesture of
pride. Williams is reported to have asked, "how the hell
could we have any architecture when we ordered our columns
by the gross" {The Pound Era 323). The significance of the
column certainly has much to do with craftsmanship, but both
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Pound and Williams direct the question toward economics.
When the question arises in "Of Being Numerous," the root of
the dilemma is found not in mechanization, mass-production,
or usury. Oppen, not surprisingly, finds the question to be
one of metaphysics.
The object in question in Oppen's poem is the inscribed
date of 1875 on the pylon of a bridge. The nineteenth
century date is telling, pointing back with Williams to a
time when one would bother to date such a thing, when it was
thought to be 'permanent.' And it is also shocking in the
city of corporations, this thing that has lasted, this sign
that this place does pre-date us, that others came before.
And the question of pride is not absent either. But these
all come together into a moment, one of the "sad marvels."
The subject of the section is not the bridge, the pylon, the
date, or the men who chiseled that date into the stone. The
subject is the speaker's reaction to it. One wants to speak
of a Joycean epiphany, but it is rather a moment of symbolic
transference. The historical record of what is taken as an
instance of authentic building as dwelling is named as
"consciousness// Which has nothing to gain, which awaits
nothing,/ Which loves itself" (CP 150). This Cartesian
consciousness which hovers disembodied above the footpath is
V

simultaneously the source of the subject/object metaphysic
already critiqued and the source of a powerful way of being
that is for Oppen, despite any limitations and dangers, the
necessary path for humanity. It is "the life of the mind,"
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and what will soon be troublingiy troped as "the shipwreck
of the singular".
That "we are pressed, pressed on each other" is not
necessarily a product of modernity but an essential
condition, and the complaint seems to arise simultaneously
with it (CP 150). The factory provides the necessity, and
the tenements rise to fill it. Freud tells us this
'civilization" is our discontent, Sartre tells us Hell is
other people, and Oppen tells us, yes, of course, but this
is what we've chosen.
The choice is central. The will of the "we" that has
chosen to inhabit and embody (the word here at its most
literal) this force, this pressure (a weight in its bed), is
divisible into its singular lives. This is the difference
between Humanity and the sea: we are more than this weight.
Or so we constantly assert. The American city is the
causeway in which the mass of humanity flows, and each human
voice believes itself singular.
This tension is not new. This tension is not even
American. This tension is human --as understood within a
context of 'Humanity', and the questions it brings to the
fore are crucial ones.
But just as Oppen fits into a tradition of a Romantic
crisis, he also fits into a tradition of crisis philosophy
that moves from Kierkegaard through Nietzsche and Heidegger.
This accounts somewhat for his curious stance, but that
stance is made more curious by his dogged humanism, his
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liberalism, his populism, and his almost religious belief in
the possibility of humanity. The poetic and philosophic, for
all their commonalities, form opposite poles. Before moving
on, we'll examine just how Oppen does fit into this
philosophic tradition and how he keeps himself outside its
lure of solipsistic despair.
The central tropes of the poem revolve around Oppen's
strange nomenclature for a standard opposition: singularity
and numerousness for individuality and community. This
latter, in its fallen state, has been variously labeled the
crowd, the herd, or the they-self (das Mann). That this
latter element, this oppressive 'they' exists, that it is
oppressive, that it endangers the individual's ability to
exist in a proper attitude toward his world, is taken as
simple fact. Kierkegaard rails against it and suffers
personal seclusion in the face of it. Nietzsche simply
disdains it and is awestruck by the incredible power it
wields. Heidegger gives it the place of Satan in the
spiritual development of his Da-sein as he continually
applies the vocabulary of Genesis to his critique. Even
Martin Buber, in his brilliant critiques of Kierkegaard^ and
Heidegger, seems to feel no reluctance in naming the mass of
humanity as fundamentally botched and dangerous to the soul.
The essential difference, and the essential question, is how

^Heidegger seems impossible to imagine without Kierkegaard, and it is in
that way only that Kierkegaard seems to really connect to Oppen's
thinking.
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one lives his or her individual existence in the context of
this "numerousness."
Heidegger's answer is especially poignant for Oppen
because it holds such an appeal. Its romantic valorization
of the single individual as bearer of language, shepherd of
Being, revealer of Truth, rhymes nicely with Oppen's
romantic tendencies. Heidegger speaks to the artist and for
the artist and in weary want of an artist. It is not
surprising that so many artists have found his voice
compelling. But there are fundamental contradictions within
Heidegger's discussion of the relation between Da-sein and
the They. These contradictions, rather that necessitating a
refusal of the doctrine, lead Oppen into a space of
uncertainty where the examination of the philosophy's
problematic leads into the circuitous questioning that is
the poem. The force of the poem comes from the refusal to
either ignore the contradiction or let it be subsumed under
any dialectical finagling. Oppen finds in Heidegger a
dramatic demonstration of his own unease. It is the very
question of being numerous.
Heidegger allows only a few defining characteristics of
Da-sein. One is its dwelling, its being-there (as the name
more than suggests), its worldliness. Another is its
being-with, or Mit-dasein, which accepts the other not only
as valid but as defining of Da-sein's very existence. We
exist in our relationship to the world and to others.
Furthermore, the Being of Da-sein is defined as "Care," a
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slippery term, yes, but even the most simplistic cognitive
thinking of the word must acknowledge its relational nature.
Having already discussed Da-sein's Being-in-the-world, let
us now examine this Being-with as Care as characteristics
for a moment and assure ourselves of its centrality.
As Heidegger attempts the disclosure of Da-sein in its
everydayness, he asks the question, "Who is it who is in the
everydayness of Da-sein?" {Being and Time 107). So far,
Da-sein is only the "I" that exists in its "there". It is a
self. But in this world there are other beings, not simply
objects that Da-sein approaches as objectively present, but
other Da-sein, other selves who alter our very attitude
toward the "I," for they are in-the-world as well, and their
existence is tied up inexorably with mine. Despite the
compulsory language of subject and object, there is here
required a recognition of the very sameness of the other, of
the impossibility of imagining an "I" without it.
"The others" does not mean everybody else but
me-- those from whom the I distinguishes itself.
They are, rather, those from whom one mostly does
not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is,
too. This being-there-too with them does not have
the ontological character of being objectively
present "with" them within a world. The "with" is
of the character of Da-sein, the "also" means the
sameness of being as circumspect, heedful
being-in-the-world.
{Being and Time 111)
To a great degree it is others, the they, whom we 'take
care' of as manifest in "concern." This being-with as care
is so fundamental that any authentic being-one's-self is not
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being separate from the they, but is rather "an existentiell
modification of the they" {Being and Time 122), This
definition makes selfhood always a shipwreck, a separation
from the theyOr so it appears. Martin Buber's critique of Heidegger
and the they-self calls this talk a sham.^ Heidegger's
doctrine, he asserts, is wholly monological. The individual,
the "I," seeks resoluteness as a solitary being. Buber
points us toward Heidegger's pathways to becoming
"resolute," and shows how they all point Da-sein away from
being-with and toward solipsism. Da-sein becomes resolute by
moving through angst and toward one's own death --for
Heidegger the most individual affair--, and by learning to
answer the call of conscience, the call which brings Da-sein
into its guilt, or knowledge of its thrown state. There is
also a backward movement to this resoluteness that connects
one with his historical destiny. This is an unstable and
potentially troublesome movement and constitutes the only
real connection with others Da-sein need have, and that
connection is with an extinct --and romanticized-- ancestry.
What is central is that Heidegger pays lip service to a
relational grounding for Da-sein, while Da-sein's becoming
resolute is a wholly individual affair. Selfhood is,
finally, a positive and permanent modification of the they.

^Between Man and Man pgs 163-181.
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Buber says that Heidegger's self is a closed system,
and that is finally the bright light of shipwreck. That
separation may lead to creative acts of will, but they make
the self sick. Buber accepts a great deal of Heidegger's
project, but wishes to ground it in a genuine relation
between man and man.
I think this revision of Heidegger, through Buber, is
the closest to Oppen's standpoint, and it of course resolves
none of the difficulties still inherent to that project.
What Oppen finally takes from Heidegger is his Romantic
belief in the quiet power of the individual mind to reveal
truth. The movement of this thought is important as well,
and I think that it is telling, and most important, that for
all the philosophical turning and re-turning, call and
response, Oppen could have --and surely did-- read Blake's
Jerusalem. There too we find a self sick and divided, its
creative powers compromised both by its relation with and
separation from its other aspects. And there too, the final
awakening comes with the simplest of revelations: "This is
friendship and brotherhood; without it man is not"
{Jerusalem 96.16).

This alignment between the "shipwreck of the singular"
and the creatively nihilistic impulses of Heidegger and
Nietzsche is given credence by section 8's discussion of
"Amor fati" (CP 151). Here Nietzsche's love of fate, as
typified by the "Eternal Recurrence of the Same," functions
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as one response or alternative to our choice of being
numerous. It has its affinities to what Oppen sees as a
metaphysic based on concepts such as luck, and is dismissed
in its symbolic form --the serpent eating its tail-- as "the
root/ of evil" (CP 137), Fate and destiny, contrary to the
individual will (disregarding any possibility of a
Zarathustrian will-to-fate), strips humanity of its
responsibility and signals the resigned death-in-life given
its most poignant expression in Eliot's The Waste Land. This
state (as well as that poem) is the necessary state for
conversion. The nature of that conversion is endlessly
variable, but Blake's renovation of the individual and its
sensory-creative powers, leading toward an apocalypse on a
larger socio-political scale, certainly rhymes more with
Oppen's thought than, say, joining the Anglican Church.
Anglicanism, of course, may well be much more consoling to
the individual than an attempted Blakean apocalypse of the
soul, but the latter is almost certainly what "Of Being
Numerous" is moving toward.
The circle of fate that moves steadily by, shifting
like the clouds, is propelled only by a vulgar temporality:
"Among days// Having only the force/ Of days." This
resignation to fate as history, to an amorphous social
project long forgotten, suffers most greatly from its total
lack of praxis. The question, unasked today, is that of
praxis:

George Oppen

22

What do we believe
TO live with? Answer.
Not invent --just answer-- all
That verse attempts.
That we can somehow add each to each other?
(CP 31)
This earlier manifesto appears in "Blood from the Stone"
(importantly marking Oppen's return to poetry after
twenty-five years of silence) and already the seeming lack
of project is oppressive. What are we doing and why? These
are the basic questions for civilization, the "Most simple/
Most difficult."

Part Two: -the Reden^tive Movement (Section 9-14)
Section nine opens with a quotation from one of Rachel
Blau DuPlessis' letters. In essence, it is simply a
misapplication of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle,
though it is poignantly misapplied. The question "Whether,
as the intensity of seeing increases, one's distance from
Them, the people, does not also increase" reinforces the
separation of the singular poet, but also deconstructs the
very concept of the numerous as something objectively
present. As we approach the sea of the Them, we find only
individuals, and this simple fact makes the force these
individuals form especially troubling. These lines also
reinforce a separation between 'practical' social action and
the poetic dedication to vision.
Oppen's answer to these charges is once again that the
only life is the life of the mind. "I can enter no other
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place": that quiet and dreadful statement exemplifies the
"shipwreck of the singular" (CP 152). But, there is an
explicit valorization of the poetic power in his assertion
that this entering of the self, this search for vision, that
"instant in the eye," is worth the requisite distance from
the people. We must enter the singular for what it offers.
The dream of the beach —the shipwreck metaphor slowly
filling out-- is a dream of a place where the singular is
held in its unearthly bonds, where the sea laps at one's
feet, where one has access to genuine vision, eternity in a
grain of sand. This is a prototypical romantic valorization
of the individual

without any wit or irony, though not

without reservation. The bright light of shipwreck is still
light, and light is that first, most powerful miracle. The
question remains, what kind of vision "the people" offer,
and how one is to escape the obvious solipsistic trap that
this valorization opens.
Section ten outlines Oppen's philosophy of failure,
perhaps the most homegrown, primitive metaphysic imaginable.
The metaphysic revolves around simple human dialogue and the
fore-acceptance of the failure of that dialogue. We begin
with a rejection of a kind of numerous art, the dythrambic
art of the late sixties that would destroy the "isolated
man." Oppen says simply, "I will listen to a man, and when I
speak I will speak, tho he will fail and I will fail. But I
will listen to him speak." This is the only hope, and the
reactive response to the failure of this hope is to try and
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find a voice of the masses. This voice, the poem tells us,
is nothing, and says nothing.
Instead, Oppen refuses to discard the simple dialogic
metaphysic, despite an only half-ironic admission of its
failure, because it is, to a degree, the height of our
progress. That it has not supplied us with the happiness we
await is something we must learn to bear.
The light seeps into section eleven as into the city,
unwarranted, undeserved. This is again miracle. Another
miracle is that the city does not exclude the possibility of
joy.
But before any moment of joy we have the city figured
as man, a movement made explicit in Blake's poetics, and
taken up by Williams' in his Paterson. Oppen imports the
technique and employs it throughout the poem in more subtle
and implicit ways than either of the two. Here, the
buildings are empty shells, much like the cave/skull images
that proliferate throughout Blake's work, awaiting some
self, any self, to enter. But of course, one can enter no
other place but one's self, and Blake's caverns are almost
always symbolic of an enclosed or imprisoned self. The
individual standing in the city waves only to himself, a
mildly comical moment in the poem, but the imagery drives it
home. The buildings "stand on low ground, their pediments/
Just above the harbor" (CP 153). This image rhymes with the
poet as Crusoe standing on the beach, staring out to sea,
seeing only himself, while the water moves at his feet. This
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waving to oneself comes to look like a kind of intellectual
masturbation. As Buber tells us, "that one can stretch out
one's hands to one's image or reflection in a mirror, but
not to one's real self" [Between Man and Man 167). TVnd
again, the cry for dialogue is heard.
"Speak// if you can// Speak" comes like the voice of
one crying in the wilderness, and we receive a small story
about Phyllis^. Phyllis is transported by a moment of joy,
her heart is "suddenly tight with happiness" at the vision
of a spot of light on the curb. She has sudden access to the
miracle of light and place. Oppen says, this moment, this
light, cannot demean us, and he simultaneously declares that
it is not 'art.' That it cannot demean us is a statement of
faith. This moment is essential to human happiness. It is
central to the simple existential fact that we want to be
here. That it is not art is a statement of aesthetics and
terribly obvious. Phyllis is not experiencing 'art' (in
quotes), but life, the world, light and joy. She is
experiencing for a moment what it means to be human. In this
light, 'art' vanishes.
Sections twelve and thirteen form a contrasting pair,
and this pairing is used to examine the modern world as held
up against the primitive. This is a dichotomy explored by
many, and the ends to which it is used are legion. Some use
it to enforce a city as jungle metaphor, stressing the

^"Not neoclassic": another wink at Paterson.
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primitiveness of modern life. Reznikoff's subway station®
works, for the most part, in this way:
This subway station
with its electric lights, pillars of steel, arches of
cement,
and trains-quite an improvement on the caves of the cave men;
but, look! on the wall
a primitive drawing.
{Reznikoff 2; 31)
But as Reznikoff never left the city, knew nothing other,
his relationship to it is significantly different from
Oppen's.
Another pole is the valorization of the primitive, the
backward glancing toward origins that appear to be lost or
at least dangerously corrupted in the modern world.
Heidegger can be quite extreme in this movement. In his
Introduction to Metaphysics, he rejects the basic narrative
of "the development of humanity from a wild huntsman and a
traveler by dugout canoe, to a builder of cities and person
of culture" (165).
These are notions from cultural anthropology and
the psychology of primitives. They arise from
falsely transferring a science of nature that is
already untrue in itself to human Being. The
fundamental error that underlies such ways of
thinking is the opinion that the inception of
history is primitive and backward, clumsy and
weak. The opposite is true. The inception is what
is most uncanny and mightiest.

®More on this important locale later.7
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This longing for "the inception" is what appears to be
manifest in Oppen's description of the 'primitive'
relationship to the world.
They made small objects
Of wood and the bones of fish
And of Stone. They talked
Families talked.
They gathered in council
And spoke, carrying objects.
They were credulous.
Their things shone in the forest
(CP 155)
And the insistence that it will "never return, never" with
its elegiac tone, does seem to speak to Heidegger's entropic
version of modernity. But while Oppen gives prominence to
the primitive's relationship to their objects and their
world, in particular to their overcoming of an objectifying
relationship, the emphasis falls most on their ability to
speak, their "council" dialogue that sustains them. Buber
wishes to find proof of this primacy of relation in the
primitive's language.
The nuclei of this language, their sentence-words-Primal pre-grammatical forms that eventually split into
the multiplicity of different kinds of words-generally designated the wholeness of relation. We say,
"far away"; the Zulu has a sentence-word instead that
means: "where one cries, 'mother, I am lost.'"... What
counts is not these products of analysis and reflection
but the genuine original unity, the lived relationship.
(J and Thou 69-70)

The emphasis on origins remains, but the sense of the value
of those origins has shifted in predictable ways. Whereas
Heidegger would find at the origin Being and Da-sein in a
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right relationship to that Being, Buber finds, manifest even
in the language, the essential relation between beings. This
is the relation Oppen seeks everywhere and cannot find in
modernity. (One need only compare the verbs applied to each
group to determine their relationship to the world. The
primitive makes, talks, gathers, speaks, and carries; the
modern finds, shops, chooses, judges, develops.) The
contrasting moderns
...develop
Argument in order to speak, they become
unreal, unreal, life loses
solidity, loses extent, baseball's their game
because baseball is not a game
but an argument and difference of opinion
makes the horse races.
These are the ghosts that endanger one's soul, and how does
one begin to even attempt to speak to such a ghost? How does
one begin to reestablish the dialogue

of the council in a

world where a rotten bureaucratic process stands in its
stead. The only possibility, it seems, is simple dialogue
between individuals, and Oppen has already labeled that
endeavor a failure®.
The only possibility of it ever returning (though he
will explore other possibilities, as he must) is apocalypse,
now able to be realized in the most un-spiritual terms,
those of nuclear annihilation. This possibility stands as an

^Section 13 is particularly interesting in its shift of context. As it
appeared in "A language of New York", it was simply another beat in the
anti-modern diatribe, whereas here it is the second movement of a
dialectic, no less damning, but more compelling in its dialogic shape.
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imposing force behind all of the poems, and the nihilistic
tendency it seems to produce is, at best, a Nietzschean wish
for danger. If we are now totally endangered, might we not
begin asking the simple and most difficult questions? No,
"they will come to an end/ first of all peoples" to do so.
The section ends with another indignant cry of singularity:
"One may honorably keep// his distance/ if he can."
The following section immediately speaks of the
impossibility of that distance. It heroically names
individuals who emerge from that force of numerousness, as
if trying to establish and maintain their reality. Yes,
there is a force that is 'the people,' and they continually
counteract the wish and need to speak, but there are things
to be said, perhaps these names, these single lives to be
spoken out. The poet speaks out, drowned by history which
only moves over him with the force of days, its
forward-moving wheel, and perhaps what he cries is: "Find
me" (CP 158).

Part Three: A New Covenant: (Sect:ionl5-26)
Sections 15 and 16 demonstrate Oppen's editorial abilities.
Both sections have been stripped of any relevance to their
original contexts but acquire new valences and resonances
within the poem.
Fifteen, or the 'chorus (androgynous),' appears first
as a somewhat sinister lampoon of what Oppen thought to be
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the central movement of contemporary poetry written by women
(Letters 110). He mourns the lack of a strong tradition, of
a monumental voice, for women poets, and sees most of the
poetry appearing around him to be concerned mostly with
making itself heard rather than attempting a poetic opening
to the world. At one point in his correspondence Oppen
decries the lack of metaphysical thought in women. Troubling
as all this may be, the re-contextualizing of these lines
(and the emphasis on the androgyny of the chorus) signal a
radical rethinking. Perhaps, as with Phyllis and her spot of
light, this cry is not 'art,' but it is recognized as a
genuine, human cry. It is the cry of loneliness in
seclusion. It is Oppen's cry.
Similarly, the quotation from Fear and Trembling
ignores its original context completely- The movement of the
thought seems in itself appealing to Oppen, but it is also a
kind of manifesto, a declaration that the poet has not (or
should not) resign himself. In these lines speaks one of the
most powerful tropes of Oppen's oeuvre: the Orphic journey
to rescue love.

In this spirit the poem pushes onward,

attempting to search out the dangerous path upward, and
fighting the urge to look back.
Central to the task of rescuing love is the task of
rescuing language. We find the same image applied at the end
of "A Narrative" where the speaker outlines the project to
...rescue
Love to the ice-lit
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Upper World a substantial language
of clarity, and of respect.
(CP 140)
Here, love and language are inseperable, and in section
seventeen we find the downward movement enacted again as the
poem moves into the underground realm of the subways where
the "roots of words/ dim". This way of envisioning the
subway is not unique; Reznikoff has multiple such visions of
the city's underground, and Eliot's Four Quartets begins its
Dantesque descent into asceticism in the London tube, but
Oppen is attracted to a more complex vision. His underground
is both the 'anti-ontological' world of the they-self where
language is corrupted, but it is also the Freudian
underworld, a Greek underworld, a place of origin that
contains the possibility of both vision and rebirth.
Reznikoff gives an inscription for the subway: "This is
the gift of Hephestus, the artificer,/ the god men say is
lame," {Reznikoff 1; 111) and this ambivalent vision is
found also in Oppen's "Vulcan" in which the crippled girl is
both the creature of this underworld and the creator. That
poem's sadness comes from a sense of betrayal of the
childhood dreams of possibility, a driving underground of
those nascent creative powers (it is, therefore, a very
Blakean poem), but in section seventeen we attempt to
reconcile ourselves with our choice of being numerous and
ask, what this movement could mean. Oppen sees in it a
fleeing from selfhood and responsibility but also a desire
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for praxis. "He wants to say/ His life is real,/ No one
knows why." Again it is the cry of the lost soul aching to
be found, but to find him, we must navigate through the
"ferocious mumbling, in public,/ Of rootless speech.
The next triptych of sections moves us back into the
subway by way of Vietnam and the atrocities committed there
in a curious diffusion of numerousness and singularity. The
difference becomes more and more difficult to establish. The
military action, in the name of a people, operates as the
disembodied hand of a bewildered public. It is a public
immured in an objectifying metaphysic that makes "a plume of
smoke, visible at a distance/ in which people burn" appear
"ordinary" (CP 160). But within this numerousness is the
individual will, turned atrocious. Wittgenstein's fly in the
bottle becomes a man in a helicopter, hanging above the city
that burns. This is the other pole of the bright light of
singularity, the shipwreck of an ethic that advocates
pouring napalm on children. If this is a tension we think
will simply go away, we are fooling ourselves, and may as
well cut our own throats. But we can't.
And so, section twenty moves into a despairing search
for consolation in the face of these facts. It moves quickly
through shallow rationalizations for humanity's addiction to
massacre, a dedication to a history of moments, the sad

^'^'Roof is itself a difficult trope to explicate. It speaks less of a
philological origin, as in Heidegger, than of an honest, sincere
relationship to language.
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marvels. Finally, the obsession is with death, a Freudian
death-drive coupled with an erotic thrill at the news of
war. For, "who escapes/ Death// Among these riders /Of the
subway" appears to be a simplistic rationalization. But far
from accepting the inevitability of mortality, the subway
riders are instead subjects of a death-in-life, a cycle of
destruction and rebuilding without praxis. They are victims
of their own guilt and failure, of their complicity with a
ruined ethic. In a stunning lyrical shift, Oppen holds out
the possibility of forgiveness, and simultaneously aligns it
with a furtherance of the death-instinct that wishes finally
to simply not matter.
We might half-hope to find the animals
In the sheds of a nation
Kneeling at midnight.
Farm animals,
Draft animals, beasts for slaughter
Because it would mean they have forgiven us.
Or which is the same thing.
That we do not altogether matter.
In the sub-linguistic world of the subway, the unwholesome
burden of civilization pushes one ever downward. The hope of
rescue seems small, and the movement of the poem accepts and
celebrates this smallness.
This smallness, this belief in a simple, clarifying
simplicity does not lead to primitivism, but instead finds
itself, like Phyllis' spot of light, manifest by the very
city itself.
There can be a brick
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In a brick wall
The eye picks
So quiet of a Sunday
Here is the brick, it was waiting
Here when you were born
Mary-Anne.
The tonal shift of this section, developing out of the
elegiac conclusion of section twenty, signals a genuine
shift of approach. The voice is paternal and quiet, patient.
It calls Mary-Anne, picked singly from among the numerous,
into a consciousness which experiences the miraculous world
in its 'minute particulars'. The first three lines could not
be more simple and direct in their telegraph meter. They
tell us what we know, that the world is impossibly complex,
and simple. This is a voice that is moving closer to
silence, to inexplicable clarity. Silence is both a goal and
a trap for Oppen. There is the Wittgensteinian mantra that
says "what we cannot speak about, we pass over in silence"
(Tractatus 7), and a line from Brecht (much quoted by Oppen)
that says that sometimes it can be a crime to write of
trees. This speaks to Oppen's constant concern that what he
is doing in his poetry is simply rationalizing inaction,
talking himself into his dark. It has affinities with
Beckett's constant movement toward silence, a silence that
is a withdrawal, as if every word were a confession being
extracted under torture. In its brightest light, the poem
wants to enact the consciousness it describes, but that
Emersonian eyeball, that transparent sphere that takes in
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the world still resembles too much the hermetic womb of the
solipsist. The question still remains, and we follow a
recovering movement that appeals to the most basic human
emotions and perhaps the last remaining ties between
individuals: those formed in the family.
The first exploration of this theme shows its
destructuring, its infection by the city of corporations.
The swiftly changing vocabularies, the changing of the
language, is accelerated by the dominance of consumerism and
media jingoism. That "the people will change again" is not
incidental to this shifting language (CP 163). The very
roots of the words, the seed in the ground, "the lump" under
the soil, is changed in this acceleration. The "entity/ of
substance" is infinitely variable and therefore unstable. It
threatens to become meaningless.
This is made more poignant as the lump in the soil,
buried beneath the blind pressure of numerousness, becomes
the embryonic child, the child produced in a horror of
sexuality:
In two dozen rooms.
Two dozen apartments
After the party
The girls
Stare at the ceilings
Blindly as they are filled
And then they sleep.
This serializing of sexual relations, of procreation, in
which the girls stare blindly beneath the blind pressure,
demonstrates the 'world' turned into a factory farm of
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advertising set up to produce only commodified language and
lives.
Section twenty-four approaches this state of things
with the biblical call for numerousness. "There shall be
peoples". This is the covenant, we are told, and in a
letter, Oppen explicates the covenant as signifying once
again the miracle of place. "'The covenant is' that in this
unlikely world, 'there shall be Peoples' and people"
{Letters 321). Yet, the covenant is, by definition, a
promise, and the covenant to the Israelites was not simply
that they would be a people, but that they would be a light
unto the world. This covenant, as we have already seen, has
devolved into a sterile generation lacking all motivation or
purpose. The speaking out of the covenant is initially
ironic, as it has already failed, but still requires
speaking out, for it is a covenant of great import.
But the young still, perhaps instinctively, long for
connection, for 'roots'. They fill the old buildings (and
are nightly 'filled' themselves) in an unaware desire for an
historical sense, for their missing "peasant traditions," as
Williams has it {Imaginations 131). They are "The Pure
products of America," but where Williams says they "go
crazy," Oppen has "investing". This is a troubling word
here, ambiguous as it is. The young may well be "investing,"
as one must in the corporate city, in a financial sense.
Read this way, investing simply stands in for "go crazy."
But they also have the power to invest the buildings with
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history and purpose, acting the Nietszchean giver of values.
They are transforming what were once storehouses for
immigrant workers into something new, changing the
"half-forgotten" "ponderous business" that made the
tenements battlements. Or so one might hope. If this
movement is underway we see little sign of it. But that the
Chinese wall of the city still stands, that the people still
inhabit and constitute this wall, that the wall exists to
keep out and hold in, this leaves little hope. They instead
"carry nativeness/ To a conclusion/ In suicide" (CP 165).
This leads us into the central section of the poem.
Twenty-six takes all that has come before it and sets it
spinning. It is part rant, part meditation, part confession.
It embodies, in its microcosm, the whole movement of the
poem, and it signals the end of the back and forth struggle
between the singular and the numerous as encountered thus
far. With a great uneasiness, Oppen here attempts to wash
his hands of the project, and the remaining sections will
again move toward the quiet stillness, part Ars Poetica, and
part personal confession. But first let us examine this last
cry before the poet disappears into the underworld.
We begin by outlining, once again, the problem at hand.
Oppen reduces it to its lack of praxis, its loss "of a
metaphysical sense/ Of the future," without which there can
be no meaningful covenant. Each individual feels himself the
end of "a chain of lives, single lives," not necessarily a
culmination, but an end. We recognize this singularity, but
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cannot formulate, as the poem has been attempting from the
start, a metaphysic that can encompass this knowledge
coupled with our need for community, the "boundaries of our
distances." We cannot, finally, get outside ourselves even
enough to find any "common sense," that phrase acquiring new
valences here. All that we have to stand on is the "denial/
of death that paved the cities," a Freudian sublimation that
only exacerbates the problem. The cities are paved
"Generation/ for generation" which is to say that the
project is unendingly exponential in its denial of death,
but also that this is generation for generation's sake. Once
more we have a useless propagation, a metaphysic that hopes
to find some purpose in simply adding each to each.
But even this project fails as the new generations
inherit a corrupt and suffering world in which they are
all-too-single, cut off from their generation, supplying
"irrelevant objects" in direct contradistinction to the
primitive peoples who carried their objects through the
forest.
And the single mind, the consciousness that floats
above it all, can do nothing against the natural world. Our
singularity too is conceived as part of a traditional
negative objectification of the natural world, in which the
single mind plays hero in the tragedy that is his world. The
shattered self that is this hero, shattered in a Blakean
sense, disconnected from itself and incapable of wholeness,
has dreamed this world. The city, "Fold within fold/ of
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residence," is the city and the mind, the mind's own place.
It has made its Hell, and singly, it cannot make a Heaven of
it, no matter how it tries.
The closing movement is back to a visionary
consciousness. To experience the world through its minute
particulars, to reside (dwell) within it as opposed to over
and against it, to attempt finally to see. This is always
the saving movement, and it has already been seen in its
possible limitations, but there is a genuine faith in the
renovating power that allows one to
...see through water
Clearly the pebbles
Of the beach
Thru the water, flowing
from the ripple, clear
As ever they have been.

Part Four; The Renovation of the Self (section 27-40)
Having already cursorily described the final sections of "Of
Being Numerous," I want to now assert that these sections
continue to fit a pattern of Romantic crisis. Thus far, the
poem has been speaking almost solely of modernity on the
larger social scale, wishing to upend cultural mores,
destroy economic and metaphysic systems, and move 'humanity'
toward some --as of yet undisclosed-- New Jerusalem. The
individual, in this movement, was set up as the nemesis of
the modern forces, the antihero to the dustpan culture, and
its possible source of redemption. The inherent dangers
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posed by the valorization of the individual were stated,
understood, and finally accepted as necessary. But the
project couldn't get off the ground. The poet carries his
lamp in the daylight, crying that the culture is dead, and
no one hears. The mind might move mountains, but this
mountain of flesh, this humanity, remains unmoved.
This failed revolution, ending as it does in its moment
of clarity and vision, turns the revolution inward. Harold
Bloom describes this as a fundamental aspect of Romantic
poetry,but it is also a fundamental part of the
Judeo-Christian ethos that Romanticism grew out of. The
apocalypse is forestalled. The time is still yet to come. In
the meantime, one sets his house in order.
How one reads Oppen's reaction to this failure is
debatable. Rachel Blau DuPlessis makes the claim that after
these poems Oppen "simply turn[s] his back and move[s] away
from the necessity for this struggle into a beautiful, stark
landscape of awe, almost devoid of man-made objects and
certainly empty of a mass of people" (DuPlessis 76). That is
to say, he flees into that most traditional escape of the
pastoral. This overstates the case a bit, for those pastoral
movements have always been present, and a concern for
humanity is far from abandoned. Oppen's last published lines
are a turn on Eliot's Prufrock: "till other voices wake/ us

^^"The Internalization Quest Romance" in Romanticism and Consciousness:
Essays in Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Norton, 1970), pg
xy-zz.
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or we drown" {Primitive 31), and there is a certain sense
that after thirty years of tortured writing, Oppen simply
felt entitled to collapse into landscapes. But DuPlessis is
right in emphasizing the narrowed sphere of relations, the
emphasis on family and the cultivation of Buberian
relationships. This becomes primary to Oppen's redemptive
journey.
This journey will also move underground, into the
basements of the self, to try to restore the relationship to
language. This is seen now as the poet's fundamental task.
The workman sweeping the basement floor, searches for a
word, "like a dishonored fatherhood," searches for the
roots. The walls bear the marks of the forms, the beams used
to build the basement, but also the shadows of the forms in
this Platonic cave. The workman sifts through the shadows,
blindly as tradition would have it, to find "the one thing"
(CP 168). This is the solitude of the poet: the bright light
of shipwreck, "the narrow, frightening light/ Before a
sunrise." That is to say, the task to be accomplished before
the new dawning.
And as the world apocalypse is forestalled and
transformed, the individual starts again to try to find his
connection to others. The family unit becomes the model for
(or modeled on) the 'Primitive' society. They are the
council within which one speaks, and the baffling
hierarchies of father and child are given here a much
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greater attention that the simple generation for
generation's sake confronted earlier.
Section twenty-nine is addressed to "my daughter," a
dialogic move the importance of which we can easily
appreciate. Again we find the paternal voice, calmly
attempting to bestow something, and confronted with its own
failure. The father and the daughter are both "caught in
reality/ together," and both must try to feel their way.
That he is speaking to his grown daughter makes this
paternal voice even shakier, and when we hear "I have a
daughter/ but no child" the fact that this is a linguistic
distinction makes it no less true. Our relations are
predicated by our dialogue, by what is said, and the poet is
here trying to work his way into a confession. Happiness as
a concept seems empty enough and when placed against the
vision of the house being caught in the dawn light, it
becomes vacuous. That happiness is life, our being here, is
what he means to say, what he says later, in another poem:
"What is or is true as/ Happiness" (CP 197). The subject is
life, and the father has so little to say. He finds himself
caught up in the common, rootless language, trying to avoid
platitudes, trying to be honest, and yet compelled to speak.
And so he does:
And in the sudden vacuum
Of time...
...Is it not
In Fear the roots grip
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Downward
and beget
The baffling Hierarchies
Of father and child
As of leaves on their high
thin twigs to shield us
From time, from open
Time
This is a restatement and reinterpretation of the "denial of
death" that paved the cities, and it is a rejection of the
metaphysic that sees life as only single and the end of a
chain of lives. As he says in "the Image of the Engine": "I
know that no one would live out/ thirty years, fifty years
if the world were ending/ with his life" (CP 19). It is in
the face of history, of a force that moves only with the
force of days, that "open time", that the roots --the
parent-- clutch downward, make themselves a dwelling place,
that the child should glow as the extension of possibility
that would die otherwise. The desperation is acknowledged,
but also the beauty, for the child is testament to the
miracle of place. "If one had been born here/ How could one
believe it?" (CP 172), we are asked, which is to say, how do
we begin to believe it, being born here. This Heideggerian
awe at the world (complete with Heidegger's metaphoric
landscape) is then set up against section thirty-one's
microcosm of unfolding sense. Without conceding the question
of whether "to know is noble," he paints a simple but
beautiful picture of that witnessing. Knowledge comes with
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an almost (or completely) physical "touch," a reaction to
the world, to another, to the

unknown.

This is as far as the I/Thou system can progress, it
seems, attaching oneself to a select few, to attempt to
experience real dialogue with them. To disregard systems of
knowledge, epistemological prisons in which the other become
an object of knowledge present at hand, this is almost
impossible even with those whom we love. But it is possible,
just as joy is possible, just as beauty. Beauty, which
twists the perfect life in a flood of desire. The desire:
"not truth but each other". This opposition begs the
question, of course^^, and the poem seems to say that truth
as knowledge is empty, that "each other" is precisely the
truth one is seeking. This need, the desire for human
connection
Which is ours, which is ourselves.
This is our jubilation
Exalted and as old as that truthfulness
which illumines speech.
Truth here retains the Heideggerian meaning as aletheia,
while simultaneously critiquing Heidegger's system for
becoming resolute. The connection of individuals, in loving
dialogue, is the truth which illumines speech, the key to

^^Also notice the similarity between this epistemology and Henry James'
description of the artist's power "to guess the unseen from the seen, to
trace the implication of things, to judge the whole piece from the
pattern" (Art of Fiction: Tales of Henry James, 352. Norton, New York &
London, 1984) .
^^it is, of course, a play on Keats' "truth is beauty, beauty truth"
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renovating language and therefore humanity. But this is, of
course, slow going and difficult to imagine on a social
scale.
But the way one approaches such relations is already
determined by social conditioning, and the petty, though
pervasive, separations of man and woman remain. Blake's
emanations are female shades of masculine selves, and though
they are essential to the wholeness of the self, they
perform destructive obfuscations such as hiding the "most
evident God/ under a covert" (CP 174; Jerusalem 30.32).
Section thirty-four speaks as a comment on Jerusalem and its
implicit sexual politics. It begins in a celebratory
precession of the world and its "beautiful particulars".
Albion finds his wholeness in the minute particulars of the
world once he has joined again with Jerusalem, his feminine
emanation. This is the feminine will done so much damage by
the various voices of the book. "Infiniteness" is put in
place of God, in Oppen's poem, and in this he follows
closely with Blake. But Oppen makes explicit a connection
between infiniteness and the feminine as generative creator.
Women carry life, yes children, but literally life, with
them into the dangerous and uncaring world. That they do so,
heroically or not, is testament to the infiniteness that is
found within them. They are tired and they are desperate,
and they carry us still.
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Section thirty-five is a tiny flash, an apocalyptic
afterthought that erupts at the seeming impossibility of the
task at hand.
...or define
Man beyond rescue
of the impoverished, solve
whole cities
before we can face
again
forests and praries...
"Solve" is the word the whole section turns on, and it
seems quite out of place. It speaks initially of a kind of
social contract, some solution to the problem of the city,
but we have already seen how these solutions are lacking.
And once man is defined as "beyond rescue" the only
'solution' left seems to be once again the wish for some
nuclear catastrophe, to clear the playing-field and begin
again.
But we move inward again, as the poem returns to the
miracle of the world, "the obvious". "That which one cannot/
not see" is how Henry James defines the 'real,'^"^ and to be
enworlded is to "see" the world, to take it in, not as
objectively present object of knowledge. This system of
thought continues to haunt, is almost impossible to escape.
That "each/ Man or woman/ Near is/ Knowledge" is a maddening
fact. The final answer to the question whether to know is

^'^James, Henry. Critical Muse: Selected Literary Criticism, (New York:
Penguin Books, 1987).
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ennobling is finally "no, it is madness." These paths of the
mind, or socially constructed modes of thinking and taking
in the world, must themselves be broken, or there is little
else left but that apocalyptic fire.
Section thirty-seven continues to hammer at linguistic
degradation, to try to create its language of clarity and
respect. This begins here, ironically, as revision,
"'...approached the window as if to see...,'" is quoted from
Oppen's first book of some thirty years before. Here is
Henry James again, and Heidegger, whose essay "What is
Metaphysics" cites boredom as an attunement that "manifests
beings as a whole" {Pathmarks 87). And the three of them all
cross when Oppen uses the word "boredom" back in nineteen
thirty-four. But here, as the poet climbs out to the
precipice, so much the wiser now, he says he should not have
written of the weatherswept world visible through that
window/poem, but of the detritus of a civilization that
obscures that view. That is what one cannot not see or
speak. The century of argument since James' time has led
only to the proliferation of abstractions, what cannot be
"seen" at all. Or --and we have learned by now to observe
these transitions-- to speak of the motes themselves, the
chain of lives, "links of consequence" that are still
relevant "at the mind's end". This last phrase is obscure,
but it invokes both an image of the borders of the mind,
such as are described in "Route" --"These things at the
limits of reason, nothing at the limits of dream, the dream
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merely ends"— and also the mind's end which is death (CP
196). This latter valence points us toward the next two
sections in which the subject appears to be Oppen's dying
father, but is also Oppen himself reflected. That baffling
hierarchy of father and child is one link of consequence
that seems especially "relevant" at the mind's end.
Thirty-eight addresses the nurse who will overcome
simple objectifying knowledge in relation to the old man.
"How could one know him?" we are asked. "You are the last/
Who will see him/ touch him" is not, as it may first appear,
a lament. It is rather a description of two individuals
entering into an authentic relation, be it Buber's I/Thou or
Heidegger's 'care'.
A letter to Philip Levine describes Oppen's experience
with his sick father and his nurse, and gives us entry,
finally, into the riddle of the "sad marvels":
Message that my father (in S F) was dying.
Hypochondriac family;
my father less ill than that,
the meeting in his hospital room as equivocal, as
difficult, as dangerous to me as all our meetings-- The
nurse came into the room and asked me to wait outside a
moment. I walked down the hall to a little waiting room
and sat down. The floor-nurse on duty recognized me (I
look like my father)
She said, I guess what a man
cares most about in his life is his son.
I was
startled and absolutely unprepared.
My father's
temperature was running fairly high, I realized that he
must have talked of me. My face must have shown how
startled and how unprepared I was. The nurse saw it,
and she began to cry
God help us all.
{Letters 208)
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This is an example of the infinite series of "occurrences"
that flash upon us. These sad marvels are when one really
sees the world. "Neither for self/ nor for truth" these
moments come upon us, but they move us and change us.
Baffling indeed.
And that is, essentially, the final movement of the
poem. We have seen the revolutionary struggle turn inward
and seen demons subdued. But section forty gives us Oppen's
"joke on Whitman" and the "curious" hanging down the page
like a quiet question, but it also shines forth as a kind of
manifesto, a symbolic (doubly symbolic) figure that embodies
and emanates the bright light of shipwreck. In this land
that is in some sense our home, there is a dream of liberty.
We aren't surprised if Oppen acts bashful about this
sentiment, curious as it is, but it is a positive statement
after all. With one word he moves back outward from the
private epiphany in "the room of a very old man" back into
the social sphere. The poem ends by looking out, as if
through a window, and finding a world constantly asserting
itself as real. Therefore, the poem ends in joy.

Conclusion:
One of the primary difficulties in approaching Oppen's
poetry is trying to place it within a larger framework. It
is customary to label him an ^objectivist', though while
Oppen never denied the name it is clear that beyond the most
basic emphasis on form, on seeing the poem as object, each
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*objectivist' imagined the label as meaning something
distinct to his own work. There was no manifesto, and there
were no dogmatic definitions. This very point might tell us
more about Oppen's work than any manifesto could. Oppen
defied any dogmatism or prescriptive definition other than
his own very subjective and difficult to classify insistence
on sincerity and clarity.
Where his position becomes interesting is that he
openly defies any imagined split between Romanticism and
Modernism. In Oppen's work, they are continuous. One might
certainly make a similar claim for many other modernists,
but Oppen seems to insist on the continuity whereas most of
his contemporaries insist on something more like a radical
refusal of Romanticism. In contrast to this popular
conception, Oppen offers this description of his influence:
"[Rjeally Blake is more important to me than Williams, and
several philosophers may be more important than Pound. The
contemporary poets aren't the most important thing in my
life, with the exception of those few things that really
matter to me" [The Contemporary Writer 184).
There is a certain amount of ^anxiety of influence'
present in this statement, to be sure, but also a great
degree of truth. Oppen's belief in the primacy of Poetry is
unabashedly Romantic in its conception if not its execution.
Oppen does not, nor could he, write like a high Romantic.

am thinking especially of Williams in his Spring and All.
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Oppen is thoroughly Modernist in his technique, and his
position of skepticism and quietude is in direct conflict
with any hyperbolic voice or claim. This is what creates his
unique sound, feel, and power: he explores and undergoes
traditionally Romantic themes while applying Modernist
techniques of syntactic shifting and sometimes willful
obscurity. This last point is said in seeming contradiction
of Oppen's many claims to clarity, and in closing I wish now
to explore briefly what that clarity might mean.
Oppen tells L.S. Dembo in their conversation that he
considers the image to be "a test of truth" {The
Contemporary Writer 174). He gets himself into a
considerable amount of trouble in trying to explain this
statement to Dembo, in trying to make such an idea relate
properly to the act of poetry. He goes on:
I'm trying to describe how the test of images can
be a test of whether one's thought is valid,
whether one can establish in a series of images,
of experiences... whether or not one will consider
the concept of humanity to be valid, something
that is, or else have to regard it as being simply
a word.
(175)
It should be granted that this does little to clarify how
such testing of images is enacted, and we notice that
Oppen's single example is of something definitively
unimagistic, an abstraction called humanity. If we say
simply that this is a negative example, that the
impossibility of humanity is already accepted here, then we
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must disregard all of "Of Being Numerous." Rather, we must
rethink both our conception of the image and of truth.
This is Heidegger's most lasting and important
influence on Oppen: he shows him a path out of "sloppyAmerican imagism" and into a visionary poetic. While many
poets have been influenced by Heidegger's thinking on
aesthetics and poetry, few seem to have taken it so much to
heart, or managed to actually put it into practice. What
this influence means is that when Oppen calls the image a
test of truth he is not referring to any vulgar conception
of truth as correspondence, but rather of truth as
uncovering, as revealing, as image itself. What is true is
what is made manifest, what appears. This explains Oppen's
slightly eccentric refusal to write of anything he hadn't
seen with his own eyes, and it explains his ongoing
fascination with teasing out the implications of such an
invaluable abstraction as ^humanity.' How and in what way
does Humanity disclose itself to us? "Of Being Numerous"
gives us flash after flash of alternatingly beautiful,
gruesome, and horrific revelation, of humanity --for better
or worse-- stepping out into the clearing of the poetic
field of vision.
Oppen is haunted by what reveals itself. He is
tormented by it. He is in love with it. He believes --with
seeming sincerity-- in the absolute primacy if the poetic
project in the renovation of humanity, and he is filled with
the Romantics' despair in the face of the possible failure
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of that project. His absolute integrity stems from his
refusal to descend into any ironic distance from that
despair or to simply engage in stylistic posing in the midst
of it. What he relies on is his own clarity of vision.
"Clarity, clarity, surely clarity is the most beautiful
thing in the world" (CP 185). This is simply another way to
say that what is beautiful is that the world is here, that
we are in it, that there is something for us to stand on.
Perhaps most importantly, the poet 'sees through water,'
sees the world made manifest, and in doing so, can believe
in the truth, in the reality of the world, and in its
shocking beauty.
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